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The Experience of Coincidence:
An Integrated Psychological
and Neurocognitive Perspective
Michiel van Elk, Karl Friston and Harold Bekkering
Abstract In this chapter, we focus on psychological and brain perspectives on the
experience of coincidence. We ﬁrst introduce the topic of the experience of coin-
cidence in general. In the second section, we outline several psychological mech-
anisms that underlie the experience of coincidence in humans, such as cognitive
biases, the role of context and the role of individual differences. In the third and
ﬁnal section we formulate the phenomenon of coincidence in the light of the
unifying brain account of predictive coding, while arguing that the notion of
coincidence provides a wonderful example of a construct that connects the
Bayesian brain to folk psychology and philosophy.
1 Prelude
This book concentrates on the topic of coincidence. In this chapter, we focus on
psychological and brain perspectives on the phenomenon of coincidence. Humans
frequently experiences coincidences in life in the sense of the Oxford dictionary:
A remarkable concurrence of events or circumstances without apparent causal
connection. To shed light on this issue, we will ﬁrst introduce the topic of coin-
cidence in general. In the second section, we outline several psychological attri-
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butions that underlie the experience of coincidence in humans like cognitive biases,
the role of context and the modulation of the experience of coincidence as a
consequence of individual differences. In the third and ﬁnal section we formulate
the phenomenon of coincidence in the light of the unifying brain account of pre-
dictive coding, i.e., the assumption that brains are essentially prediction machines
supporting perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming
sensory inputs with top-down expectations and predictions. In particular, we will
show how the experience of coincidence can be understood as an example of
Bayes-optimal model selection.
2 Introduction
In 2011 the newspapers reported the remarkable case of Joan Ginther from Texas.1
Over several years she won four times a multi-million dollar jackpot, by buying
scratch-off lottery tickets. It started in 1993 when she won $5.4 million, followed by
$2 million in 2003, $3 million in 2005 and in 2010 she won a $10 million dollar
jackpot.2 Such an extraordinary pattern of wins cries out for an extraordinary
explanation. Residents of the town of Bishop were convinced that Joan was born
under a lucky star or that God was behind it. Statisticians estimated that the chances
of winning such prizes four times in a row were 1 in 18 septillion.3 Combined with
the discovery that Joan had earned a Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of
Stanford, this led to the suggestion that Joan had ﬁgured out the algorithm behind
lotteries. Joan always bought her tickets at the same mini mart in Bishop. By ﬁg-
uring out the algorithm that determines the winner and the schedule by which
lottery tickets are distributed across Texas, Joan could have predicted when to buy
the winning ticket. Joan further contributed to the mystery, by refusing any
interview.
In general, humans are remarkably bad at estimating chances and probabilities
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). As a consequence, coincidental events (i.e. a
chance concurrence of events without apparent causal connection) are often imbued
with special meaning and result in the search for an ultimate explanation (Brugger et al.
1995). In the case of Joan, the explanation turned out to be less extraordinary than
initially thought: the ﬁrst win was likely based on chance, as the number of the winning
ticket matched the date of her birthday. The money that was won may have
enabled Joan to buy large quantities of lottery tickets, up to tens of thousands of tickets
1We would like to thank our colleagues Bastiaan Rutjens & Frenk van Harreveld for bringing this
example to our attention in their book on ‘Coincidence’.
2http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2023514/Joan-R-Ginther-won-lottery-4-times-Stanford-
University-statistics-PhD.html.
3http://www.philly.com/philly/news/lottery/How_outrageous_were_the_odds_lottery_legend_
Joan_Ginther_beat.html.
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a year.4 Given these large quantities the odds of winning a prize become less unlikely
than initially thought. In addition, this strategy also explains the fact that Joan (and a
friend with whom she collaborated) won a large number of smaller prizes that passed
unnoticed by the media.
In this chapter we focus on the experience of coincidence, which can be deﬁned
as the remarkable co-occurrence of two events (e.g. being called by a friend you
were just thinking about). In some cases the experience of coincidence results in the
inference that a common cause underlies the two events (e.g. some unknown ‘force’
causing you to think about a friend and causing your friend to call you). In other
cases, the co-occurrence of events is attributed to chance. The experience of
coincidence thus implies a meta-cognitive perspective, in which the most likely
explanation for the events being observed is inferred. The experience of coinci-
dence likely underlies a wide range of human behaviors and beliefs, ranging from
belief in conspiracy theories, magic and superstition to belief in faith healing and
ultimately belief in supernatural agents, like God. National surveys indicate that the
tendency to experience coincidence and to engage in superstitious behavior are
widespread, with a prevalence of 26 up to 74 percent in the UK for instance, even
among scientists (Wiseman 2003).
3 The Psychology of Coincidence
In this section we will discuss basic psychological mechanisms that underlie the
experience of coincidence. First, we will argue that the experience of coincidence is
related to the over-generalization of predictive models, which in turn are based on
fundamental cognitive biases that may actually confer an adaptive advantage. Next,
we will focus on the role of context and individual differences in the experience of
coincidence.
3.1 Cognitive Biases and Predictive Models
The experience of coincidence may be considered a speciﬁc example of the idea
that humans construct a predictive model of the world (Friston and Kiebel 2009).
This idea, ﬁrst articulated by Helmholtz assumes that agents perform inference
based on a generative model of the world (Clark 2013; Friston 2010; Friston et al.
2012; Gregory 1980; Rao and Ballard 1999; Schwartenbeck et al. 2013). Such
models incorporate associations, which can be used to predict future events (e.g.
learning that dark clouds often predict rain) and to predict the consequences of our
4http://www.philly.com/philly/news/lottery/Lotterys_luckiest_woman_Joan_Ginther_bet_ﬂabber
gasting_sums_on_scratch-offs.html.
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own and others’ actions (e.g. learning how to throw a ball in a basket).
Psychological experiments have shown that in many cases, these models are based
on fast and frugal heuristic processes, that may be advantageous in speciﬁc limited
circumstances, but that may be difﬁcult to generalize across different domains
(Gigerenzer 2012). Furthermore, it has been suggested that predictive models may
come to dominate perception, such that reality is perceived in accordance with the
constraints imposed by the model, rather than that the sensory input determines the
updating of the model. An extreme example of the dominance of predictive models
over perception can be found in research on hypnosis, in which proneness to and
acceptance of suggestibility manipulations can result in an altered perception of the
environment (Raz et al. 2005). Similarly, it has been suggested that an over-reliance
on predictive models and a failure to update these models in accordance with the
available sensory evidence may be the basis of illusion in normal perception and
delusions and hallucinations in psychopathology (Adams et al. 2013; Corlett and
Fletcher 2012).
At a very basic level the experience of coincidence and the construction of a
predictive model may be related to basic principles of reinforcement learning and
classical conditioning. The behaviorist Skinner already noted that pigeons, when
food was presented at a random reinforcement schedule, tended to display
superstitious-like behavior (Timberlake and Lucas 1985). The co-occurrence of a
speciﬁc behavior (e.g. pecking at the wall of the cage) with a speciﬁc consequence
(e.g. receiving food) resulted in the subsequent reinforcement of that behavior—as
if it resulted in the presentation of the food. Similar principles of random rein-
forcement learning likely play a role in human experiences of coincidence and
superstitious behavior as well. For instance, imagine buying a lottery ticket at a
speciﬁc shop and at a speciﬁc time of the day and winning a prize. The next time
when you buy a lottery ticket, you may be inclined to buy the ticket at the same
shop at the same time—even though you know that the chances of winning at this
speciﬁc shop are as low as buying a ticket somewhere else.
An over-generalization of the principles of reinforcement learning may often be
adaptive, as it enables the learning of novel action-effect contingencies. The
so-called ‘false positives’ generated by learning illusory contingencies based are
relatively harmless. Evolutionary psychologists have thus argued that the emer-
gence of superstitious behavior and the belief in coincidence is the consequence of
adaptive cognitive biases (Foster and Kokko 2009). In a relatively stable and
predictable environment, failing to detect a speciﬁc contingency between two
events (e.g. knowing that smoke often signals ﬁre) is typically more costly than
erroneously inferring a relation between two unrelated events (e.g. believing that
drumming causes rain). The evolution of superstition is a speciﬁc example of the
error management principle (Haselton and Nettle 2006), according to which if there
is an asymmetrical distribution between type I errors (i.e. a ‘false positive’) and type
II errors (i.e. a ‘false negative’), a bias develops toward committing the least costly
error. The experience of coincidence may be related to the overestimation of
contingencies in a predictive model. As long as the environment is relatively stable
such a model is adaptive, but it may become maladaptive in a different context.
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For instance, in young children at home an over-estimation of the amount of control
over the environment may be adaptive, as they still need to learn which aspects of
their environment can be controlled, but may become maladaptive during adoles-
cence, leading to increased risk taking (Heckhausen and Schulz 1995). Similarly, it
has been pointed out that in games of chance, people often rely on the
over-generalization of principles of skill and practice: they approach a dice
throwing or gambling task for instance with a skill-oriented approach, as if their
speciﬁc movements or choices influence an outcome that is in fact uncontrollable
(Langer 1975). Such a bias is adaptive as long as the losses are small and the
potential gains are relatively high, but in speciﬁc contexts (e.g. casinos) this
behavior may become maladaptive, leading to risky gambling and excessive risk
taking.
In psychological research, many other cognitive, reasoning, social, memory and
attentional biases have been described that may directly contribute to the experience
of coincidence and the construction of mental models that influence subsequent
decision making (for an overview, see Kahneman 2011). The self-attribution bias
reflects the general tendency to over-attribute positive outcomes to oneself and
negative outcomes to external factors (Mezulis et al. 2004). The self-attribution bias
underlies the experience of coincidence, by incorrectly attributing two unrelated
events to a common cause (i.e. oneself). For instance, when throwing a dice or
when performing a card guessing game, people tend to take credit for positive
outcomes, while they externalize negative outcomes (van Elk, Rutjens and van der
Pligt 2015). A well-known example of the self-attribution bias can be observed in
John McEnroe, a famous tennis player in the nineteen-eighties who attributed wins
on a match to his own capacity and training methods, but losing to bad performance
of the umpire. Basically, it has been argued that the self-attribution bias reflects a
distorted perceptual process, which is driven by the need to maintain and enhance
self-esteem. As such, the selective and biased perception of the world has a strong
motivational signiﬁcance, by avoiding people from becoming passive (e.g. ‘learned
helplessness’). It has even been argued that an over-optimistic perception of one’s
own capabilities and the amount of control that can be exerted over the environ-
ment, may be adaptive and psychologically healthy (Taylor and Brown 1988).
In formal treatments of the predictive or Bayesian brain, it is fairly straightfor-
ward to show that the self-attribution bias is, mathematically, Bayes optimal. This
self-attribution bias, also known as optimism bias (Sharot 2012), is a natural
consequence of making inferences about the state of the world generating sensory
information (Friston et al. 2014). In active (Bayesian) formulations of decision
making and choice behavior, we act to realize preferred outcomes by sampling from
beliefs about the way that we will behave. Usually, these beliefs are informed by
sensory evidence. However, when that evidence is ambiguous the most likely state
of the world is the state that is consistent with our ongoing behavior (Friston et al.
2014). Because we believe our behavior will lead to preferred outcomes (that
actions can fulﬁll), this necessarily implies that inferences in an uncertain world are
optimistic and are inherently biased by beliefs about our purposeful behavior
(FitzGerald et al. 2014). A formal (mathematical) treatment of this issue can be
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found in FitzGerald et al. (2014) and Friston et al. (2014). In this treatment, the
neurobiological correlates of the conﬁdence in beliefs about policies are associated
with dopaminergic discharges in the brain—a theme that we will return to later.
Also, it has become quite clear that we do not perceive the world as it is. Above
all, the information provided at any moment in time is so abundant that we have to
be selective in what we attend to. The question how people are able to attend to the
most important information, while ignoring other sources of information has been
widely studied in psychology and is typically labeled selective attention. Donald
Broadbent started his investigations of this phenomenon after working with
air-trafﬁc controllers during the second world war (Broadbent 1958). In that situ-
ation numerous competing messages from departing and incoming aircraft are
arriving continuously, all requiring attention. His basic ﬁnding was that air trafﬁc
controllers can only deal effectively with one message at a time and so they have to
decide which is the most important. Based on his and other ﬁndings, cognitive
scientist argued that we must have a kind of sensory buffer and the input has to be
selected based on the physical characteristics for further cognitive processing.
However, this bottom-up approach to information processing was challenged, and
for example the attenuation model of Anne Treisman suggested that although we
can indeed only limitedly process multiple sensory inputs at once, attention is
attenuating speciﬁc sensory information rather than applying an early ﬁlter on the
non-attended sensory information (Treisman 1964). The next step in attention
research continued this line of thinking and actually argued that attention is able to
select information at a very late stage of processing. MacKay (1973) presented
participants information via both ears with a speciﬁc instruction, which ear to
attend. He found that shadowed ambiguous passages with information on the
unattended channel that clariﬁed the ambiguity (ear 1—bank; ear 2—river or
money) helped the subsequent memory test regarding the relevant channel; par-
ticipants were better in recalling sentences for which the un-shadowed word was
meaningful, thereby further challenging the bottom-up nature of attention. The
research of MacKay nicely illustrates that attention is serving a goal—in his
experiment acquiring information from any source available to predict the infor-
mation relevant for the task. Thus, perception is subjective by nature and the feeling
of coincidence based on cognitive biases can be considered in the light that we
selectively attend to certain stimuli in the context given while ignoring other
information available.
This form of selective attention can also be cast in terms of hypothesis selection.
In other words, we are compelled to select among a number of competing
hypotheses and search out conﬁrmatory (or dis-conﬁrmatory) sensory evidence for
those hypotheses. Clearly, the evidence or stimuli that we attend (or ignore) will be
highly sensitive to the current hypothesis entertained by the brain: Humans are
biased to selectively attend and recall information that is highly salient or infor-
mative (Mcdaniel et al. 1995). In addition, people often rely on representativeness
and availability heuristics when judging the likelihood of situational descriptions
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and may use counterfactual thinking to regulate
affect in response to unexpected positive or negative outcomes (Roese 1997).
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In general, people are characterized by a misperception of chance events (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974), as shown for instance by the tendency to perceive an ‘ir-
regular’ coin-toss sequence like ‘H-T-H-T-T-H’ as more likely than a regular
sequence like ‘H-H-H-T-T-T’. In this example, chance events are considered as a
self-corrective process and on each consecutive toss of the coin people take into
account the past history of ‘heads’ and ‘tails’—even though the coin obviously has
no memory. The latter bias is another good example of the general tendency to
construct predictive models of the world—even in cases when such a model is not
applicable or appropriate (or in which the model should classify the coin toss as a
‘chance event’).
In sum, we argue that the experience of coincidence may be considered a speciﬁc
instance of the tendency to construct and rely on predictive models of the world.
These models may often be based on adaptive biases or prior beliefs to detect
contingencies (Foster and Kokko 2009) and/or may be supported by other
domain-speciﬁc biases that confer an adaptive advantage (i.e. heuristics) in speciﬁc
settings. An over-reliance on internal models and the over-generalization of models
to contexts in which they do not apply, may contribute to the experience of
coincidence.
3.2 Context and Model Adjustment
In the preceding section we have argued that perception of events in the world is
subjective and that cognitive biases at the personal level may result in the experience
of coincidence. Speciﬁc situations or a given situational context, may also alter your
perception of the world dramatically. As has been argued before (FitzGerald et al.
2014), agents have to determine what model to use in the ﬁrst place and secondly to
make inferences about hidden variables to evaluate the likelihood of a model and the
precision of the parameters of any plausible model. A given situational context is
likely to affect both aspects: which model to use and/or how to weight the parameters
within the speciﬁc models.
A famous example was demonstrated in a Candid Camera television show in the
1960s (the example is also mentioned in Liebermann 2007). An uninformed indi-
vidual enters an elevator ﬁlled with multiple confederates working with the show.
These confederates stand all collectively facing the back of the elevator rather than
facing the front. Almost all individuals would look quickly around at the others and
then change their orientation in order to stand in line with the confederates. This
example is presented in social psychology as one of the fundamental insights of
social cognition: “people look to the social environment and external context to
guide their behavior, particularly when the appropriate course of action is
ambiguous or undeﬁned.” This example nicely illustrates how our behavior is
context-dependent, but it also nicely illustrates how different models compete for
different inferences. Relying on previous knowledge of elevators, you have learned
that the door that opened for you when you entered the elevator is also likely the
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door that will open again when you need to leave the elevator. However, occa-
sionally, you ﬁnd elevators with two doors, one entrance and one exit door typically
at the opposite side of the elevator. The fact that all others are facing the back might
strike you as too obvious to be coincidence. Thus, multiple inferences are produced
by your brain; the elevator model which activates probabilities about potential door
locations that you might perceive to open to allow you to exit the elevator, but also
the social model, i.e., the probability that several people all face one direction that is
likely going to be the direction at which relevant information will appear. In other
words, in a causal model of the world, you expect other agents to anticipate what
will happen next, and thus you assume they are directed to the location they expect
the door to open—or, you could even infer the candid camera model, i.e., how
likely is it that people are making a joke on me. Based on the precision of these
different models in terms of what is the best inference on what I can perceive next,
most people might make an active inference and turn their side in alignment with
the others. Interestingly, this Bayesian approach on a social phenomenon like this
emphasizes “the power of the situation” as much as many other well-studied
concepts in social psychology, like the conﬁrmation bias (Asch 1956), or the
famous obedience to authority phenomenon (Milgram 1965), from a uniﬁed
framework, predictive coding. Depending on the precision of parameters from
different models in your mind you infer what you will perceive next based on the
(social) context you are in. Again, we see the emergent theme of selecting among
plausible hypotheses that explain the sensory evidence at hand. Above, we have
discussed this in terms of perceptual inference, very much along the lines of per-
ception as hypothesis testing (Gregory 1980). Here, the same notion emerges in the
context of social inference. We will return to the central role of selecting hypotheses
and Bayesian model selection below.
In ambiguous and uncertain contexts, the need for predictive models and the
need for making predictions including situational constraints increases. In line with
this suggestion, the experience of coincidence and the engagement of superstitious
behavior are often strongly related to signiﬁcant life events that have important
consequences, such as well-being, illness or death. It has been found for instance
that belief in luck and coincidence increased during times of stress and in poten-
tially threatening situations (Keinan 1994, 2002). Similarly, superstitious behavior
is quite prevalent among the performing arts and in sports, and the occurrence of
superstitious acts typically increases with the importance of the outcome (e.g. playing
the ﬁnals; cf. Burger and Lynn 2005). Interestingly, large cultural differences exist in
the experience of coincidence and in probabilistic thinking (Wright et al. 1978):
Asians compared to westerners typically engage less in probabilistic thinking in terms
of ‘cause-and-effect’ and this may be related to the ‘fate-oriented’ view in Eastern
religion and philosophy. These ﬁndings highlight the role of context in the experience
of coincidence. Again, these ﬁndings make sense in a broader evolutionary frame-
work, according to which the detection of (illusory) contingencies and the need for
predictive models is especially important in potentially ambiguous or threatening
situations.
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Speciﬁc contexts may trigger an over-reliance on internal models and a failure to
update these models in accordance with the available sensory information, may
cause the experience of ‘coincidence’. An extreme example of a failure to update
one’s cognitive model may be found in the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger et al. 2008). In his seminal work, Festinger describes a religious sect
believing that the earth would be flooded and that they would be rescued by
extraterrestrials in a flying saucer. When the critical time had passed and the pro-
phecy did not come true, rather than giving up their beliefs, the sect became even
more fervent in their faith. Many psychological studies have shown that, rather than
changing one’s model based on new evidence, humans respond to cognitive dis-
sonance by discarding the evidence or assimilating the evidence to one’s current
model (Elliot and Devine 1994). For instance, many believers put their trust in a
religious leader, who in turn imposes their views on his followers. An increased
reliance on religious authority results in a reduced process of error monitoring and a
failure to update one’s model based on the available evidence. Recently it has been
argued that religious rituals are speciﬁcally aimed at reducing the process of error
monitoring, thereby enhancing people’s willingness to uncritically adopt a pre-
vailing worldview (Schjoedt et al. 2013). In line with this suggestion, it has been
found for instance that believers are characterized by a reduced activation of the
frontal executive monitoring network when listening to a religious authority
(Schjoedt et al. 2011). In such contexts, a failure to update one’s model may result
in the experience of coincidence, as observed for instance during faith healing in
which a common cause is inferred (e.g. ‘God’) for two scientiﬁcally unrelated
events (e.g. prayer by the religious authority and the (often) temporary recovery of
illness).
3.3 Individual Differences and Precision
In addition to contextual effects, individual differences in personality traits and
beliefs also play an important role in the experience of coincidence. Some people
may prefer more certainty and precision in their predictions than others. In addition
some people may more strongly rely on their predictive models than others and may
be characterized by systematic biases with respect to taking sensory information
into account.
It has been found that the tendency to perceive coincidences is related to the
individual trait of need for control (Hladkyj 2001). People scoring high on the need
for control (and likely requiring a higher precision in their prediction models) were
more likely to experience unusual coincidences as personally signiﬁcant (c.f., the
self-attribution and optimism bias above). In addition, belief in a meaningful world
and the imbuement of random events with meaning has been associated with a
stronger visual attention capture (Bressan et al. 2008): this ﬁnding could reflect that
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the tendency to perceive coincidences as meaningful is related to a process of error
detection of information that is conflicting with one’s cognitive schema’s.
Several studies have suggested that individual differences in the reliance on
internal predictive models of the world are also related to the experience of coin-
cidence. Participants scoring high on schizotypal personality traits are characterized
by an increased reliance on internal predictive models and by difﬁculties to update
their model based on new sensory evidence (Corlett and Fletcher 2012). In addition,
a relation has been suggested between schizotypy, the perception of coincidence,
magical ideation and paranormal beliefs (Williams and Irwin 1991). It has been
found, for instance, that people scoring high on schizotypy and magical ideation are
more prone toward detecting illusory contingencies (Brugger and Graves 1997). In
this task, participants were required to discover the rule whereby navigating a
virtual mouse through a maze would result in a reward. In fact, the reward was
directly coupled to the amount of time spent navigating: if the participants spent
more than three seconds in the maze, they would receive the reward, whereas if they
spent less time no reward was provided. Many participants developed beliefs in
illusory contingencies (i.e. the belief that moving the mouse repetitiously along a
speciﬁc path would result in the reward) and the amount of illusory hypotheses that
were believed were directly related to magical ideation. In another study using a
dice throwing task it was found that the perception of chance events as meaningful
is related to a tendency for repetition-avoidance e.g. in guessing outcomes (Brugger
et al. 1995). Interestingly, in the same study it was found that the tendency to avoid
semantically related guesses was associated to a stronger belief in extrasensory
perception. Finally, it has been reported that paranormal believers show fallacies in
probabilistic reasoning task and tend to underestimate the likelihood of chance
events (Rogers et al. 2009). In addition, paranormal believers are more prone to
reporting frequent experiences of coincidence during their life (Bressan 2002).
These ﬁndings illustrate that individual differences in model selection and the
reliance on internal models can have a strong effect on the experience of
coincidence.
In summary, when we use internal models to make inferences about the causes of
our sensations, we are in the difﬁcult game of carefully balancing the precision of, or
conﬁdence in, sensory evidence relative to prior beliefs. In hierarchical models (with
multiple levels of abstraction), each level is equipped with a precision that deter-
mines how much it predominates over other levels. Crucially, the precision at each
and every level of the hierarchy has to be optimized. This optimization itself depends
upon biases or priors about expected precision (or expected uncertainty) that can
lead to very different inferences and behavior. This may be manifest as normal
intersubject variation in cognitive biases or, indeed, provide a formal explanation for
false inference in psychopathology (Adams et al. 2013).
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4 Predictive Coding and Coincidence
We have deﬁned the experience of coincidence as an inference about the remark-
able co-occurrence of two events (Brugger et al. 1995). To conclude, we present a
more theoretical view on how Bayesian models, implemented in our brain, can lead
to the experience of coincidence. The experience is labeled as a coincidence, when
our explanation appeals to the notion of a ‘coincidence’, as opposed to some
underlying common cause. When a causal inference is made, the experience is
labeled as coincidence; in contrast, ‘non-causal’ inference makes the concurrence
coincidental. This means that we must have the capacity to infer that an improbable
(remarkable) concurrence was or was not causally mediated. This entails the
capacity to postulate two concurrent hypotheses (improbable events may or may not
have a common cause), and we must also have a (meta-representational) concept of
this inferential dilemma.
In this section, we turn to a formal treatment of coincidences from the per-
spective of the Bayesian brain. To set the scene, it would be useful to rehearse the
simplicity of the formal perspectives we have been appealing to. The most general
principle guiding action and perception is presumed to be a maximization for the
evidence of models used to explain the sensorium. The inverse or complement of
model evidence is surprise, prediction error or a quantity called variational free
energy. This means that the brain is trying to minimize prediction error (or maxi-
mize model evidence). A popular scheme for implementing this minimization is
predictive coding, for which there is a substantial amount of circumstantial evi-
dence in terms of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology (Friston and Kiebel 2009).
So what does it mean to maximize model evidence? To understand this, we have to
appreciate that model evidence has two components:
Log evidence ¼ accuracy complexity
Where, mathematically:
Log evidence ¼ ln Prðconsequencejhypothesis)
Accuracy ¼ E ½ln Prðconsequencejcause; hypothesis)]
Complexity ¼ D½Pr(causejconsequence; hypothesis)j jPrðcausejhypothesis))
where E[] denotes an expectation or average and D[] the relative entropy or
Kullback-Leibler divergence. This mathematical formulation of the goodness of ﬁt
of a model is interesting because it says that complexity is the divergence between
our prior beliefs (i.e., cognitive biases and preconceptions) and the (posterior)
beliefs adopted after seeing sensory information.
Crucially, a high model evidence requires a parsimonious but accurate expla-
nation for sensory consequences (of inferred causes). Generally, these explanations
rest upon internal or generative models with a deep hierarchical structure (possibly
reflecting the hierarchical organization of cortical areas in the brain). This deep
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structure is particularly important from the point of view of coincidences, because
appealing to a common cause adds an extra level or depth to the hierarchical
explanation that can minimize its complexity (and maximize model evidence). To
see this clearly, we need to see why complexity is so important.
If we explained all our sensations with a multitude of independent causes, we
would have a very accurate (low prediction error) explanation; however, the
complexity of this explanation or hypothesis would be very high. This is because
complexity increases with the degrees of freedom or number of causes invoked to
explain data (the divergence above). The problem with complex but accurate
models is that they do not generalize to other situations—a problem known as
over-ﬁtting in statistics. This means a good model should also be parsimonious and
use the smallest number of causes to explain (sensory) consequences. In turn, this
means we are compelled to construct unifying hypotheses about common causes
that reduce the cardinality of the causes of our sensory explananda.
It is therefore entirely Bayes-optimal to select hypotheses or models that ascribe
a common cause to coincident events; particularly those that are generated by some
agency (e.g., oneself, a deity or the CIA). In fact, several studies have shown that
the tendency to attribute coincidental events to external agents is universal and may
underlie supernatural and conspiracy beliefs (Banerjee and Bloom 2014; Imhoff and
Bruder 2014). It is at this point we see the utility of ‘coincidence’ as an alternative
hypothesis for the co-occurrence or succession of coincident events. To make this
concrete, consider a situation where you are meeting a friend for coffee and he
arrives at exactly the same time as you. This coincidence is surprising and will call
for an explanation in your (Bayesian) brain. This is because surprise has to be
minimized. There will be a number of competing hypotheses; for example, your
friend has been waiting for you, your friend knew exactly when you would arrive
because he has been spying on you, you both caught the same tram to the café, the
meeting was ordained by God and, ﬁnally, it was a coincidence. All of these
competing hypotheses or models provide an accurate explanation for the events you
have witnessed; however, they differ profoundly in terms of their complexity as
scored by the number of (implausible) deviations from your prior beliefs. As we
have noted above, selecting the best hypothesis corresponds to accepting the model
with the greatest evidence (this is known as Bayesian model selection in statistics).
This will be the hypothesis with the minimum complexity; namely the explanation
that requires the least divergence from your prior beliefs. In other words, an a priori
plausible explanation is most likely inferred (e.g., you arrived on the same tram).
However, if there are no tram stops near the café, then the most plausible hypothesis
could be a coincidence; provided you believe, a priori, coincidence is plausible. The
hypothesis you select will determine whether coincident events (in the real world)
are experienced as a coincidence.
The key insight provided by the above treatment is that we are equipped with the
hypothesis or heuristic that things can be explained by ‘coincidences’. This is a
constructive explanation—as opposed to simply ignoring co-occurrences. If this is
true, then the way that we deal with (real-world) coincidences depends strongly on
our prior disposition to ‘coincidence’ as a causal explanation. The very fact that we
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have this hypothesis at hand to explain surprising contingencies is a testament to the
sophistication of our hierarchical generative models and may not be seen in lower
animals (like pigeons). It also may provide one perspective on the formation of
delusional systems in psychosis, where the coincidence hypothesis is simply not
available.
There are some other interesting predictions that follow from our line of argu-
ment. Above, we have noted that the conﬁdence in our beliefs about chosen out-
comes may be signaled by dopamine in the brain. This stands in contrast to
alternative explanations based upon dopamine discharges reporting rewards or
preferred outcomes. Coincidences may offer an interesting resolution to the com-
peting explanations for dopamine responses. If coincidences resolve surprise, then
realizing something is a coincidence should resolve uncertainty and increase
precision resulting in elevated dopamine ﬁring. Conversely, if dopamine reports
preferred outcomes, even when they are surprising, dopamine should show a
response to unexpected rewards that are entirely coincidental.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have provided an analysis of the experience of coincidence from
a psychological and neurocognitive perspective. As humans we construct predictive
models of the world that enable us to generate predictions and to minimize surprise.
The experience of coincidence may result from cognitive biases, such as the
self-attribution bias and attentional biases, which are Bayes-optimal. Thereby
the notion of coincidence provides a wonderful example of a construct that connects
the Bayesian brain to folk psychology and philosophy.
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